Against Disquotation by Heck, Richard Kimberly
Against Disquotation
Richard Kimberly Heck
Department of Philosophy, Brown University
Abstract
Disquotationalism is the view that the only notion of truth we really need is
one that can be wholly explained in terms of such trivialities as: “Snow is white”
is true iff snow is white. The ‘Classical Disquotational Strategy’ attempts to
establish this view case by case, by showing that each extant appeal to truth, in
philosophical or scientific explanations, can be unmasked as an appeal only to
disquotational truth. I argue here that the Classical Strategy fails in at least
two cases: attributions of truth to context-dependent utterances and uses of
falsity in psychological explanations of behavioral failure.
Deflationary theories of truth come in two basic forms. Views of the
first sort concern the truth of propositions. The rough idea is that there
is nothing more to its being true that snow is white than snow itself ’s
being white. An especially strong form of the view would be that the
sentences
(1) Snow is white.
and
(2) It is true that snow is white.
express the very same proposition, and similarly for other such pairs.1
A weaker form of the view would be that (1) and (2) are analytically or
conceptually equivalent. An intermediate view would be, to borrow a
term from Hartry Field, that (1) and (2) are ‘fully cognitively equivalent’,
meaning, to first approximation, that believing (desiring, etc) the one
1 We’ll see in section 2 there is potentially a confusion implicit in this way of putting
the point, but it will do for now.
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has the same significance for an agent’s behavior (including their merely
mental behavior) as does believing the other.
The other sort of view, which is known as disquotationalism, is a view
about the truth of sentences. This time, the rough idea is that nothing
more is required for the sentence “Snow is white” to be true than snow’s
being white. The strongest possible form of this view would be that (1)
and
(3) “Snow is white” is true.
have the very same meaning. A weaker form of the view would be that (1)
and (3) are analytically or conceptually equivalent. And an intermediate
form, which is what Field (1994, pp. 250–1) initially endorses, is that (1)
and (3) are ‘fully cognitively equivalent’.
Both the view that I am calling ‘disquotationalism’ and the name
by which I am calling it have their roots in the work of W. V. O. Quine
(1970b, p. 12), who famously wrote: “By calling the sentence [‘Snow
is white’] true, we call snow white. The truth predicate is a device of
disquotation.” Elsewhere, however, Quine (1956, p. 187) explicitly denies
that (1) is “analytically equivalent to” (3), or even necessarily equivalent
to it, insisting that “agreement in truth value can be claimed, and no
more”: His view, that is to say, is just that (1) and (3) are materially
equivalent, and almost no-one would deny that claim. Of course, Quine is
famously skeptical about analyticity, but the reason for his caution is not
to be found there but instead in an objection that Alonzo Church (1950)
had brought against an analysis of belief-sentences due to Rudolf Carnap
(1947, pp. 61–2).2 If (1) and (3) are synonymous, then their translations
into German
(4) Der Schnee ist weiss.
(5) “Snow is white” ist wahr.
should also be synonymous, which they plainly are not. But there is
now a large literature on Church’s objection. Perhaps some of the moves
made there could be adapted to this case.
2 Carnap’s proposal was that “John believes that snow is white”, for example, would
relate John to the sentence “snow is white”, rather than to a proposition or something of
that sort. Church credits the idea of using translation as a test for synonymy to C. H.
Langford (1937).
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A similar, but to my mind more worrying, objection was voiced many
years before by G. E. Moore (1953, p. 276).3 In the case of propositional
deflationism, the objection is that the truth of (2) seems to require the
existence of the proposition that snow is white, whereas the truth of
(1) does not. The obvious response is that the objection tendentiously
assumes that the complement clause “that snow is white” refers to the
proposition that snow is white. But all the objection really requires is
that there is something to which the complement clause refers to which
no constituent of (1) refers.4 One could perhaps deny even that claim,
but a similar response is plainly unavailable to the disquotationalist,
who faces a similar objection: The truth of (3) requires that there be such
a sentence as “Snow is white”, whereas the truth of (1) does not. It would
be utterly implausible to deny that the quotation-name that occurs in (3)
is a name of a sentence, or that the truth of (3) requires the existence of
that sentence.5
Marian David (2005, §IV), from whom I learned of Moore’s case for
precedence, discusses several responses that a deflationist might explore,
arguing that none of them work. Any of these could be adapted by a
disquotationalist, but none of them seem to me to be any more helpful
in that form. There is, however, a strategy that David does not consider,
namely, the one that is actually adopted by Field (1994, pp. 250–1),
who simply concedes Moore’s objection and weakens the view to one
on which a belief expressible by (3) is ‘fully cognitively equivalent’ to
one expressible by (1) only modulo the belief that the sentence “Snow
is white” exists. Presumably something similar would need to be said
about such pairs as
(6) “Snow is white” is false.
(7) Snow is not white.
and also about embeddings of such sentences in conditionals. Whether all
that can be made to work is not clear, and David is no doubt correct that
“it is surprising that the prima facie difficulty [that Moore’s objection]
3 Moore’s lectures were originally given in 1910–11 though not published until much
later.
4 Thus, insisting upon a ‘paratactic’ treatment of complement clauses (Davidson, 1968)
would not answer Moore’s objection.
5 Pro-sentential theories (e.g. Grover et al., 1975) may deny exactly that. But consider
such generalizations as: Every true Σ1 sentence is provable in Robinson arithmetic. The
quantifier must range over sentences, and there is no indication that “is true” and “is
Σ1” apply to such sentences in fundamentally different ways.
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poses. . . is rarely mentioned” (2005, p. 387). But it is hard to see this
objection deciding the issue, either.
What will most matter for our purposes is that disquotationalism is
a much more radical view than deflationism is. To get a sense for this,
note that a disquotationalist would regard the following statement as
true:
(8) “Snow is white” would have been true even if “snow is white” had
meant that pigs fly.
This may seem surprising,6 but it is simply a consequence of the ex-
tremely strong relationship between (1) and (3) that the disquotation-
alist requires there to be. As disquotationalists understand (8), it is
equivalent to:
(9) Snow would have been white even if “snow is white” had meant
that pigs fly.
And that is because, as Field (1994, p. 266) remarks, echoing Quine, “. . . to
call ‘Snow is white’ disquotationally true is simply to call snow white. . . ”,
and that is true whether or not “is true” occurs inside a modal context. If
so, then, at least arguably, such claims as (8) are ones disquotationalists
must accept. Suffice it for now to say that Field (1994, p. 275) not only
accepts such claims but emphasizes them.7
Propositional deflationists, by contrast, have no such commitment.
They may happily regard (8) as false. Sentential truth can be explained
in terms of propositional truth thus:
(10) S is true iff ∃p[S expresses p ∧ p is true]
That is: A sentence is true iff it expresses a proposition that is true. The
crucial question is then how one understands the expression relation.
One option is to understand it too in a deflationary way. In that case,
one may well find oneself committed to (8). And some propositional
deflationists, such as Paul Horwich (1998), do hold such a combination of
6 Some people think sentences have their meanings essentially (see e.g. Simchen,
2012). I find such views difficult to comprehend and incompatible with any plausible
theory of human language comprehension. But the central issue here could be discussed
entirely in terms of demonstratives—see section 3.2—and it does not seem at all plausible
that an uttered demonstrative has its reference essentially.
7 That said, Field (1994, pp. 275–8) also explores the possibility of using a ‘extended’
disquotational truth-predicate to avoid this consequence. We’ll discuss the extended
notion a great deal below.
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views. But others, such as Scott Soames (1999), clearly do not, rejecting
deflationism about expression and seeking some substantial account
of the relation between a sentence and the proposition it expresses.
Sentential truth then becomes an equally substantial notion.
Assuming propositional deflationism, then, disquotationalism is all
but equivalent to deflationism about the relation of expression, that is, to
a view on which the notion of expression can be completely characterized
in terms of such apparent trivialities as:
(11) “Snow is white” expresses the proposition that snow is white.
If (11) is indeed a triviality, neither requiring nor admitting of substantial
explanation, then so is the notion of sentential truth; if not, then not. But
the underlying point is independent of any commitment to propositional
deflationism. In effect, what the disquotationalist’s acceptance of (8) is
telling us is that they regard
(12) The condition that must be met for “Snow is white” to be true is
that snow should be white.
as itself a sort of analytic truth, and so one that is true in all possible
worlds, no matter what “Snow is white” itself means in those worlds.
Ultimately, then, disquotationalism is not just a view about truth but
a view about content or, more precisely, about truth-conditions. Indeed,
Field (1994, p. 253) describes the central question in which he is inter-
ested as “whether truth conditions. . . play a central role in meaning and
content”.
For Field, then, disquotationalism is not motivated by skepticism
about propositions, as it is, at least to some extent, for Quine. Field’s
skepticism extends much further, to encompass any notion of representa-
tional content robust enough to capture truth-conditions. Quine (1960,
pp. 23–4) sometimes seems to doubt that it is even possible to make
proper sense of any notion of equivalence between sentences stronger
than material equivalence. But that worry emerges from Quine’s con-
cerns about the limits of ‘radical translation’ which, infamously, seem
mostly to be imposed by his behaviorism (Chomsky, 1969). Field, on the
other hand, is willing to countenance ‘theories of content’ that Quine
would not, namely, any theory that reduces content to physicalistically
acceptable notions. In fact, Field (1972; 1978) was for many years a
champion of causal theories of reference. It seems to have been his
eventual disillusionment with the project of ‘reducing’ truth-conditional
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content to physicalistically acceptable notions that led Field to embrace
disquotationalism.
What is at issue in the debate over disquotationalism, then, is no less
than this:
If the notions of meaning and content are to do the work
we need them to do, must they be characterized in terms of
some representational notion sufficient to determine truth-
conditions, in some substantial sense?
I take Field to have made a significant contribution just by realizing
that, since disquotationalism precludes any substantial notion of truth-
conditions, we can address this seemingly intractable question by asking
instead whether we can get by, in the theory of meaning and content, with
a disquotational truth-predicate. That seems much more manageable.
What is meant here by a ‘disquotational truth-predicate’ is one that
is stipulatively introduced so as to behave the way disquotationalists
think our actual truth-predicate does behave.8 A disquotational truth-
predicate is thus supposed to be one that is wholly characterized in terms
of the cognitive equivalence of a given sentence with one attributing truth
to that sentence. So the first thesis of disquotationalism is:
DT1 An intelligible notion of truth can be adequately explained in terms
of the Disquotation Principle: p“S” is trueq is fully cognitively
equivalent to S (modulo the existence of S itself).
The second thesis concerns the role that such a notion of truth is, and is
not, suited to play:
DT2 A disquotational truth-predicate can play only an ‘expressive’ role
and can never play a semantic, ‘word–world relating’ role.
The standard example of such an ‘expressive role’ is the use of truth in
generalizations, such as:
(13) Everything the Pope says is true.
Disquotationalists want to insist that (13) should be read as the infinite
conjunction of such sentences as:
If the Pope says “Dogs bark”, then dogs bark.
If the Pope says “Pigs fly”, then pigs fly.
8 One might reasonably compare the strategy I’m about to describe with a famous ‘test’
that Saul Kripke (1977, p. 265) uses in his discussion of referential uses of descriptions.
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The difficulty is that it is not clear how to express this generalization
finitely. The obvious thing to try is something like:
(14) For all S, if the Pope says S, then S.
But that is ill-formed, since S here seems to be unable to make up its
mind whether it goes proxy for a sentence (as in the third occurrence) or
a name of one (as in the second). The solution is supposed to be provided
by the truth-predicate, which allows us to reconstrue (13) as:
(15) For all S, if the Pope says S, then S is true.
This, then, is the ‘generalizing’ role that disquotationalists take the
truth-predicate most fundamentally to play (cf. Quine, 1970b, pp. 11–3).9
An opponent of disquotationalism can happily accept DT1 and DT2,
however. Some even do, on the ground that we need a disquotational
truth-predicate to express generalizations like (13) and, more impor-
tantly, such modal generalizations as “All of the axioms of Euclidean
geometry might have been true” (see e.g. McGee, 2005, p. 147). My own
view is that this is a mistake, one that results from a failure to distin-
guish between sentential and propositional notions of truth (see Heck,
2004, §2) . We’ll discuss this matter further below.
At the moment, we need only the weaker point that accepting the
legitimacy and utility of a disquotational truth-predicate does not suffice
to make one a disquotationalist. The distinctive disquotationalist thesis
is rather:
DT3 There are no legitimate uses of the notion of truth that are not ‘ex-
pressive’, i.e., that cannot be understood as uses of a disquotational
truth-predicate.
What makes one a disquotationalist, then, is the view that the only
legitimate notion of truth is the disquotational one.
The dialectic then tends to play out as follows. Opponents of disquo-
tationalism note that there are philosophical and scientific theories and
explanations in which the notion of truth seems to play an important
role. For example, both in logic and in semantics, we find such claims as
(16) A conjunction is true iff both its conjuncts are true.
9 It is, in fact, much less clear than usually seems to be supposed what this ‘generaliz-
ing’ is supposed to involve. See Heck (2019, esp. §1).
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which is supposed to express, among other things, the truth-functionality
of conjunction. What I shall call the Classical Disquotational Strategy
attempts to unmask this application of the notion of truth as really being
of the ‘expressive’ sort for which the disquotational truth-predicate was
designed. If so, then the disquotational notion of truth is adequate for the
theoretical or explanatory purpose at issue and no ‘substantial’ notion of
truth is required.10
Of course, there are other sorts of strategies open to a disquotational-
ist. They might argue that the truth-involving theory or explanation is,
for one reason or another, independently objectionable. Or they might
offer an alternative. In the case mentioned, for example, they might
argue that logic and semantics should proceed in terms of proof- or
verification-conditions, in which case (16) can be rejected in favor of
something like:
(17) A conjunction has been verified iff both its conjuncts have been
verified.
Neither of these strategies, however, is proprietary to disquotationalism.
An opponent of disquotationalism might have similar complaints.
Indeed, as Field (1994, p. 250) emphasizes, what is distinctive about
contemporary disquotationalism is precisely the thought that one needn’t
follow verificationists in rejecting the notion of truth, nor follow anti-
realists like Sir Michael Dummett (1991) in attempting to reduce truth
to something else, such as justification. Rather, disquotationalism is a
sort of quietism: It allows one to accept the notion of truth and the uses
typically made of it so long as one can somehow construe those uses as
really being just ‘expressive’. But that is to say that it is precisely its
embrace of the Classical Disquotational Strategy that distinguishes con-
temporary disquotationalism from earlier views, such as verificationism
and anti-realism, that strive either to do without the notion of truth or
to reconstruct it in other terms.
To put it differently, the promise of disquotationalism is that, instead
of having to articulate an alternative to the truth-conditional conception
of content, we can simply make do with the ‘naïve’ conception of content
that is implicit in and wholly explained by such trivialities as
(11) “Snow is white” expresses the proposition that snow is white.
10 We’ll not actually consider disquotational accounts of such ‘compositional principles’
here. I’ve discussed them elsewhere, however (Heck, 2019).
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As Stephen Leeds (1995, p. 4) puts it, disquotationalists believe that
(11), and schematic generalizations thereof, tell us “everything there is
of interest to know about how our language, and other languages too,
connect with the world. . . ”. There’s simply no need for a theory of content
in the sense in which the causal theory was supposed to be one.
My primary goal in this paper is to demonstrate that the Classical
Disquotational Strategy fails. I will begin, in section 1, by arguing that
translation must play a much greater role for the disquotationalist than
is usually acknowledged. This observation is really just a manifestation
of familiar points about what the bearers of truth might plausibly be,
but I’ll argue in section 2 that disquotationalists have paid far too little
attention to that issue, and that it has a good deal of significance for
their view. The rest of the paper investigates the consequences of incor-
porating an appeal to translation into the disquotationalist’s substitutes
for putatively truth-involving explanations. We’ll discuss two sorts of
cases: The interpretation of context-dependent expressions, which is the
focus of section 3, and what might be the most familiar argument against
disquotationalism, the so-called ‘success argument’, which will be the
focus of section 4. Ironically, it will turn out that failure matters much
more than success.
1 Disquotation and Translation
As Field (1994, p. 260) emphasizes, the thesis that p“S” is trueq is ‘fully
cognitively equivalent’ to S itself entails that truth applies, in the first in-
stance, only to sentences one understands—and so not, e.g., to sentences
of a foreign language one does not speak. That might seem surprising.
Even if one does not oneself know what “La nieve es blanca” means,
for example, one might have thought that one could nonetheless un-
derstand what it means to say that the sentence “La nieve es blanca”
is true. But, according to disquotationalism, that is an illusion. The
reason is straightforward: If an attribution of truth to a sentence is
‘fully cognitively equivalent’ to an utterance of that very sentence, then
“ ‘La nieve es blanca’ is true” is fully cognitively equivalent to—that is,
roughly speaking, synonymous with—“La nieve es blanca” itself. Since,
by hypothesis, that is not a sentence one understands, one does not
understand “ ‘La nieve es blanca’ is true” either.
In fact, however, what this argument shows is only that a disquota-
tionalist cannot make do just with what Field calls a ‘pure’ disquotational
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notion of truth: one explained entirely in terms of the Disquotation Prin-
ciple. Rather, there is a need also for what Field calls an ‘extended’
disquotational truth-predicate, which is explained in terms of transla-
tion. A sentence I do not understand is true in the ‘extended’ sense if it
can be translated by a sentence I do understand that is true in the ‘pure’
sense.11 This still has the consequence that I do not myself understand
such sentences as “ ‘If there are measurable cardinals, then there are
sets that are not constructible’ is true”, due to my lack of knowledge of
set-theory, which one might find implausible. But I shall set this concern
aside here.12
One might worry that appealing to translation will bring in content
through the back door. But the disquotationalist can insist, with Quine,
that the standards of correct translation do not have to be explained
in terms of identity (or even similarity) of content, but can instead be
explained in broadly pragmatic terms. There might then be no single
‘correct’ translation, but only a range of equally acceptable ones. That is
not obviously a problem, however (Field, 1994, p. 273).
It can seem natural and even obvious that “true” applies, in the first
instance, only to sentences one understands. I have often had people
say to me: Surely we first learn what “true” means by learning to apply
it to sentences we understand!13 This is supposed to be easy for us to
do because the rule for applying “true” is so easy to learn: One should
be prepared to assert p“S” is trueq just in case one is prepared to assert
S itself. If so, then the truth-predicate we initially acquire seems to be
a disquotationalist one, characterized in terms of something like the
disquotation principle.
We’ll return to the question whether any of that is right. What is quite
certain, however, is that the thesis that truth can, in the first instance,
only be applied to sentences that one understands is, like disquotational-
ism itself, a much more radical claim than is usually acknowledged. The
problem is that there are very few sentences that are ripe for disquota-
11 That is:
T(Σ) ≡ ∃S[S ∼ Σ ∧ T(S)]
where Σ is a ‘foreign’ sentence and S a ‘native’ one. Note the similarity to how proposi-
tional deflationists explain sentential truth.
12 Stewart Shapiro (1998, pp. 55ff; 2003; 2005) has developed an argument that
purports to show that this restriction causes trouble for disquotationalism. Field (2001b,
pp. 147–8) discusses the argument briefly.
13 And if I tell them not to call me “Shirley”, then they often add: What, you think we
start by applying “true” to sentences we don’t understand?
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tion: sentences S that are, at all plausibly, ‘fully cognitively equivalent’
to the corresponding sentence p“S” is trueq. The most obvious problem is
posed by sentences that involve context-dependence, such as “It is cold
here” or “You are a philosopher” or “That is a banana”. Familiarly, it
makes no sense to ask whether such sentences are true or false.14 But
it has become increasingly clear over the last couple decades that it is
not just the usual suspects—“I”, “here”, “you”, “this”, and the like—that
cause problems, but that context-sensitivity is nearly ubiquitous, affect-
ing even logical terms such as quantifiers. (Consider the many different
things an utterance of “Everyone is on the bus” might mean.) In fact, it
is difficult to think of any sentence outside mathematics and the ‘official’
pronouncements of the sciences that does not exhibit some degree of
context-dependence, if only for tense.
If I want to say, then, that an utterance U made by someone else,
or by myself at some other time, is true, then I need to invoke trans-
lation: U is true iff there is some sentence that I understand which, if
uttered by me now, would both correctly translate U and be true. The
‘pure’ disquotational notion of truth thus applies, in the first instance,
only to utterances made by me, at the present moment, of a sentence I
understand (cf. Heck, 2004, §4; David, 2005, p. 389). Such a notion has
limited application, to put it mildly.
A similar problem arises with utterances made by other people, even
when these do not involve context-dependence. I cannot simply assume
that anyone else means by their words what I mean by mine.15 I cannot,
that is to say, simply assume that any other speaker’s utterance of a
given sentence will be true just in case an utterance by me of the same
sentence would also be true (let alone fully cognitively equivalent).16
Similar remarks apply to utterances of my own made at other times. If
14 Quine (1970b, pp. 13–4) notes both that disquotation only really applies to ‘eternal’
sentences and that truth must (largely for that reason) be applied to utterances (or token
sentences), but he never seems to consider how those two facts can be reconciled.
15 It is sometimes suggested that we can just relativize attributions of truth to a scheme
of translation and ignore what the speaker’s words actually mean. But even Field (1994,
p. 274) recognizes that there will be contexts in which it matters very much that the
translation be a (if not the) correct one.
16 Field (2001a) has suggested that, for a disquotationalist, sentences should be typed
in terms of their ‘computational’ properties. That is a theoretical move that can be made
in response to the sorts of worries I’m expressing, and we’ll discuss a version of it below.
But my goal at the moment is just to undermine any sense one might have had that a
‘pure’ disquotational notion of truth can do any real work by itself.
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so, however, then the thesis of ‘full cognitive equivalence’ between S and
p“S” is trueq almost never holds.17
None of that would be news to Field. It is for precisely such reasons
that he insists that “true” applies, in the first instance, to sentences of
one’s own idiolect—or, perhaps, to sentences of one’s own language of
thought. But what I am arguing is that such a restriction comes at a
significant cost, namely, that the ‘pure’ disquotational notion of truth is
all but useless by itself. If a disquotational notion of truth is to do any
work, we need to use the ‘extended’ notion, which embeds an appeal to
translation.
2 The Generalizing Role of Truth
There is nothing new in the observations made in the last section. What I
was doing was just rehearsing the usual reasons to think that sentences
are not plausibly the fundamental bearers of truth. But it seems to me
that disquotationalists have failed to appreciate the importance of this
familiar point to their views.18 For one thing, it implies that it is utterly
implausible that we ‘learn the truth-predicate’ by applying it to sentences
we understand. There are, as we have seen, almost no ‘sentences we
understand’ in the required sense: sentences that are ‘fully cognitively
equivalent’ to attributions of truth to those very sentences. Indeed, as
Sir Peter Strawson (1950, p. 130) famously pointed out, attributions of
truth to sentences (and even to utterances) are quite rare in natural
language. The truth-predicate in natural language is usually applied to
propositions.
It is worth belaboring this point, both because it is easy to misunder-
stand it and because it is relevant to the sorts of claims that disquotation-
17 One might think that context-dependence is simply beside the point, because disquo-
tationalists are only really interested in ‘scientific’ language. What’s worrying Field, on
this reading, is whether the notion of truth needs to play a role in serious science, e.g.,
in physics, in which case context-dependence is not an issue. But notions of truth and
content are arguably deployed within science, in particular, in linguistics and in cognitive
psychology. It has long been an important question in natural language semantics how
truth-conditions for (actual and possible) utterances of context-dependent sentences
can be compositionally generated. And many cognitive psychologists are interested in
questions about the contents of perceptual representations that are naturally under-
stood as questions about their truth-conditions (see e.g. Burge, 1979). Field clearly takes
questions of the latter sort very seriously.
18 In part, I suspect, because of the focus, in much disquotationalist writing, on formal
languages.
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alists like to make about the ‘role’ the truth-predicate plays in natural
language. Suppose Toni says:
(18) Not all of the things Obama said were true.
The standard disquotationalist claim is that, in making this utterance,
Toni says the same thing she would have said had she instead uttered the
negation of the conjunction of the various sentences that Obama uttered,
and in some strong sense of “the same” (cf. Gupta, 1993). But, since the
sentences Obama uttered were almost certainly context-dependent, that
is false. Minimally, then, what’s needed here is an appeal to translation.
But there is a more serious problem with this sort of suggestion: It
assumes that (18) quantifies over sentences, and it pretty clearly does
not.
What I mean by this is simply that, if Toni utters (18), then while I
could perfectly well ask:
(19) Were any of them true?
it would be at best bizarre for me to ask:19
(20) Did any of them have plural subjects?
To put it differently, if you were to ask Toni, “And what things did Obama
say that were not true?” you would not be likely to get an answer like:20
(21) Obama said “There are pigs in the Rose Garden”.
but instead one like:
(22) Obama said that there were pigs in the Rose Garden.
When I say that (18) does not “quantify over sentences”, then, what
I mean is that its ‘instances’ are (related to) things like (22), not to
things like (21). This is also what Strawson meant when he said that
attributions of truth to sentences are rare in natural language. Ordinary
speakers just do not often say things like “The sentence ‘John broke
the window’ is true”. They do say things like, “It’s true that John broke
the window, but it was an accident”.21 This is at least partly because
19 Contrast: Did he use sentences with plural subjects to say any of them? Note also
that (20) is a perfectly reasonable question to ask in response to: All of the sentences
Obama uttered were really long.
20 To take a different case, Toni might say, “Obama said that he is the president”. That
is very different from her saying, “Obama said, ‘He is the president’”, even if Obama was
pointing at himself when he said it.
21 Compare: The sentence “John broke the window” is true, but it was (is?) an accident.
Points in this same vicinity pose problems for Davidson’s paratatic analysis of that-
clauses (Higginbotham, 1986, p. 39).
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of the ubiquity of context-dependence, which implies that attributions
of truth to sentences are usually non-sensical. Even “Snow is white” is
context-sensitive, at least with respect to “is” and “white”, and probably
also with respect to “snow”.
The issue here is thus not how that-clauses and other devices of
‘propositional reference’ are to be analyzed. Perhaps that-clauses refer
not to propositions but to representations of some sort (though presum-
ably not to sentence-types if only, again, because of context-dependence).
Even if so, the point I am making concerns what ordinary speakers need
to know to evaluate such utterances as (18), namely, things like:
(23) It is true that there were pigs in the Rose Garden iff there were
pigs in the Rose Garden.
They do not need to know things like:
(24) “There are pigs in the Rose Garden” is true iff there are pigs in the
Rose Garden.
Indeed, such instances of the sentential T-scheme are not only not needed
to evaluate (18), but they are worse than useless. Due to the context-
dependence of the sentence that occurs on its right-hand side, the sen-
tence (24) cannot even be evaluated for truth. Moreover, if it is Obama’s
utterance of “There are pigs in the Rose Garden” that is at issue, then
the best disquotation can give us is:
(25) Obama’s utterance of “There are pigs in the Rose Garden” is true
iff there are pigs in the Rose Garden.
But no utterance of (25) is guaranteed to be true unless it is made at
the same time as Obama’s, and even then there are other aspects of
context-dependence to consider.
The claim that we need a disquotational notion of (sentential) truth
in order to make sense of such statements as (18) thus looks to be
false. Plenty of people manage that trick, and there is no evidence
that any of them use a disquotational notion of truth to do so. It is a
different question, of course, whether one could use a disquotational
notion of truth to make sense of (18). I doubt it.22 But that is not what
22 The reason we are supposed to need a disquotational truth-predicate is because we
need p“S” is trueq to be equivalent to S not just in some weak sense but in the strongest
possible sense. Once we introduce translation, though, any such strong equivalence will
lapse.
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disquotationalists have typically claimed. Rather, they have wanted to
argue that one must have a disquotational notion of truth in order to
be able to make sense of such generalizations, which fact is supposed to
force their opponents to accept at least the legitimacy and utility of the
disquotational notion (see Heck, 2004, §1) . But there is no ‘must’ about
it. A propositional notion of truth will do just as well—and, contrary to
what Field (1994, pp. 266–7) claims, such a notion need not necessarily
commit us to “strange entities”. Whether it does depends upon how
complement clauses are to be analyzed. That is an important issue, to be
sure, but it is simply orthogonal to the one presently under discussion.
3 Translation and Linguistic Comprehension
As noted in section 1, sentences uttered by other speakers always might
mean something different for them from what they mean for me.23 As a
result, attributions of truth to utterances made by other speakers must
use the ‘extended’ disquotational truth-predicate and so will involve
translation. The crucial case, which we will discuss in section 3.2, is
that of context-dependent utterances. Before we turn to it, however, it
will be worth discussing the more general view that the role typically
played in semantic theories by truth-conditions can instead be played by
translation—a view with which Field (1994, pp. 278–9) expresses some
sympathy. The lessons that emerge will be important in the discussion
that follows.
3.1 Translation vs Truth-Conditions
To be more precise, the view I want to consider is that one understands
someone else’s speech when one knows how to translate it into one’s own
language. Something like this view is obviously present in Quine (1960,
Ch. 2), and it famously surfaces as well in the work of Jerrold Katz and
Paul Postal (1964). I do not take this view to need refuting. Ernie Lepore
and Barry Loewer (1981) have, to my mind, already completed that task.
What Lepore and Loewer do not do, however, is diagnose why such a view
should ever have seemed attractive—and why, apparently, it continues
to be attractive. That is what I mean to do. I will be arguing that this
‘translational conception of interpretation’ rests upon a confusion of use
with mention. Such confusions are themselves perenially tempting.
23 As Quine (1968, p. 199) famously put it, “. . . radical translation begins at home”.
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Donald Davidson (1967) famously suggested that successfully inter-
preting the utterances of other speakers involves coming to know such
things as:24
(26) Maria’s utterance of “That woman is famous” is true if, and only if,
Eva Longoria is famous.
By contrast, Jerry Fodor (1975, pp. 119–121), among others, has argued
that nothing so complicated as (26) is needed. Instead, we should think
of ‘semantic competence’ as consisting in an ability to translate natural
language into the language of thought.
Here is a very rough model, but one that will do for our purposes.
When someone utters a sentence, what I first do is determine how the
sentence is composed of its component words. Perhaps this is quite
complex; perhaps the ‘words’ are not at all what we’d ordinarily call
‘words’. But once the syntactic analysis is complete, all that is left for me
to do is to translate each ‘word’ that occurs in the original sentence by a
corresponding expression of Mentalese, and then to put the Mentalese
words together in a way that is determined by the syntactic analysis.
When I’m done, I’ll have a Mentalese sentence that translates the original
sentence of natural language, and I can use it to interpret the present
utterance of that sentence.25
On the translational conception, then, a central role is played in inter-
pretation by competent speakers’ possession of a sort of table that pairs
‘words’ of natural language with corresponding ‘words’ of Mentalese.26
And, in many ways, that seems like a very natural idea. But we need to
24 I’ll assume, for present purposes, that all sides are agreed that understanding is
constituted by some sort of propositional knowledge, though that knowledge may only
be tacit. (My own view is that understanding is constituted by conscious knowledge of
such facts as that expressed by (26) (Heck, 2006).) The issue here is what form that
knowledge takes, in particular, whether it involves knowing how to translate. Someone
who thought that understanding involves knowing that Maria’s utterance meant that
Eva Longoria is famous would thus be on Davidson’s side, as far as the present issue is
concerned.
25 This is not unlike the view, which Davidson (1967, pp. 307–8) discusses in “Truth
and Meaning”, that a theory of meaning can consist just of syntax plus a dictionary.
His objection is that such a theory simply fails to address the problems that exercise
semanticists. He did not, I think, anticipate that someone might simply deny that those
problems are actually of much interest, which seems to be how Field (1994, p. 269) would
respond.
26 If it were not for the creativity and productivity of linguistic competence, we could
make do with a table pairing sentences of English with sentences of Mentalese. The
issues would be no different.
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Big Papi David Ortiz
The Truth Paul Pierce
Baby Horse Alex Morgan
Table 1: Nicknames of Athletes
be careful. There are several different ways one might think of such a
table and the information it contains.
Consider, for example, table 1.27 One way to read the table is as
pairing nicknames of athletes with their given names, in which case the
first line might be written more explicitly as:
(27) “Big Papi” is a nickname for the person whose given name is “David
Ortiz”.
So, on this interpretation, the table purports to describe a relation be-
tween names, that is, between linguistic expressions. Fully to appreciate
the content of the table, so understood, one does not have to understand
any of the names contained in it. Even if you have never heard any of
these names before, that will not affect your understanding of the table.
A second construal would regard the table as pairing nicknames of
athletes with those very athletes, that is, with the people who have those
nicknames. In that case, the second line might be written more explicitly
as:
(28) “The Truth” is a nickname for Paul Pierce.
In this case, the table describes a relation between between words and
people. Fully to appreciate the content of the table understood this way,
one does have to understand the names that occur in the right column,
though not the names that occur in the left column: If one has never
heard of Paul Pierce, then one cannot understand (28).
Yet a third construal (we’ll stop here) would regard the table as
purporting to state a number of true identities, in which case the third
line might be written more explicitly as:
(29) Baby Horse is Alex Morgan.
27 Think of the nicknames, on the left, as corresponding to names from natural language
and the given names, on the right, to names in Mentalese. So the table is supposed to be
telling one something about the nicknames.
3 Translation and Linguistic Comprehension 18
In this case, the relation the table describes is wholly worldly. Fully
to appreciate the content of the table understood this way, one must
understand the names that occur in both columns.28
I hope this all seems somewhat confusing. It’s not that it’s unclear
what the three construals are. But how did you understand the table
when first you encountered it? In practice, the three construals have
an annoying tendency to bleed into one another. Even if the table had
been intended the second way, as pairing nicknames with people, some-
one who was completely unfamiliar with the names on the right could
nonetheless read the table in accord with the first interpretation and
thereby acquire information about co-reference. And even if the table
had been intended the first way, someone who was familiar with the
given names could nonetheless read it in accord with the second way
and so extract information about the reference of the nicknames. It just
is very easy to slide back and forth between use and mention this way,
especially where written language is concerned: We simultaneously read
the names with understanding and see them as objects in their own
right.
I take it, however, that what is at issue between Davidson and Fodor
is what information competent speakers have that allows them to in-
terpret speech (cf. Peacocke, 1986, 1989). And what information table 1
contains varies enormously depending upon how we interpret it. So we
must be very careful how we interpret the ‘table’ that, according to the
translational conception, partially underlies semantic competence. The
question we need to ask is: On which construal of such tables do they en-
code information possession of which would allow someone successfully
to interpret speech, i.e., in this example, to understand utterances of the
nicknames?
The third construal is clearly no help. On this construal, the informa-
tion contained in the table is simply a bunch of identities. It is irrelevant
that these truths are recorded in a mix of, say, English and Mentalese.
Worse, because the names in the left column are, on this construal, used,
one must already understand them in order to be able to understand
the table. The table, so construed, thus cannot play any role in enabling
28 I take it that this case is not what philosophers of language usually have in mind
when they speak of ‘translation’. That term tends to be reserved for a relation between
linguistic expressions, as on the first construal. Colloquial language seems to disagree,
however. The third construal is reminiscent of what ‘translators’ at the United Nations
do: They listen to speech in one language and then repeat what they have heard in
another language. We might call this enterprise restatement.
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one to interpret utterances of the nicknames. Only a table in which the
names in the left column are mentioned can play that sort of role.29
The first construal at least satsifies that condition, but it is no help,
either, for the reason given long ago by David Lewis (1970, p. 18): One
can know how to translate sentences from one language to another
without understanding either of those languages.30 For our purposes, the
right way to formulate this point is: The information that a translation
manual contains is insufficient to allow one to understand the language
being translated. It’s true that, if one does understand one of the two
languages, then one can parlay one’s knowledge of how to translate into
knowledge sufficient to allow interpretation.31 But that, once again, is
irrelevant: The question was what information enables interpretation,
and what Lewis is claiming is that information about how to translate
one language into another is insufficient by itself. He is just right about
that.
It is when the table is interpreted the second way that it encodes
information sufficient to allow interpretation: What you need to know is,
for each nickname, who bears that name; that is what the table tells you.
To be sure, the table conveys this information by using the given names
of the people in question. But that does not imply that the table contains
(let alone, only contains) information about those people’s given names.
On the contrary, what the table (so understood) does is map nicknames
to people, the people who have those nicknames. So if, in some sense,
comprehension of natural langauge uses such lookup tables, it will have
turned out that spanning the great chasm between language and the
29 A different route to this point would begin with the observation that, when we
are attempting to understand what someone else has said, we start by identifying the
linguistic expression they have produced. Certainly, this seems to be the model with
which linguists operate.
30 Davidson (1973, pp. 316–8) makes the same point a few years later—independently,
as far as I can tell.
31 It is far less clear than most people seem to think exactly how this is supposed to
happen. How is the transition from the mentioned sentence to the used one made? In the
ordinary case, one just ‘reads’ the quoted sentence. But what if one can only recognize
the quoted sentence as a name and not read the embedded sentence with understanding?
And what anyway is the analogue of ’reading’ in the case of Mentalese? One might think
of disquotationalism as offering, among other things, an answer to that question. But it
is surprising that we are now supposing that language comprehension involves one’s
forming names of sentences of Mentalese.
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world requires no more than a data structure that maps names to their
bearers.32
If one is tempted to respond that people cannot literally be contained
in such a data structure, then one is succumbing to what appears to
be an almost irresistable temptation to confuse what information is
contained in a data structure with how that information is encoded.
As we are imagining it, the map from names to people is encoded in a
table-like structure that competent speakers have in their heads, one
that is written in Mentalese. So, of course, people are not contained
in the table. They are mentioned in the table through the use of their
Mentalese names.33 To be sure, making use of the information that
the table contains involves computing in Mentalese. But, if there is
a language of thought, as we are for the moment assuming, then all
thought, whatever it is about, involves computing in Mentalese.34
Surely it has to be uncontroversial—surely no one wishes to deny—
that we are, in some sense, able to think about the external world, e.g.,
about other people.35 Nor is a proponent of the translational conception
in a position to deny that competent speakers are able to think about
linguistic expressions, since such a capacity is presupposed by the abil-
ity to translate.36 But then there cannot possibly be any obstacle in
32 I find it helpful to think, in this connection, about strongly typed programming
languages. If you want a program that will ‘interpret decimal numerals’, for example,
then what you will need (at the level of digits), in C++, is a map<char, int>, which
is very different from a map<char, char> (the first construal) or a map<int, int>
(the third one). Similarly, converting decimal numerals to integers is a very different
programming problem than converting them to binary numerals (a much easier one,
actually), even if integers are represented, in the machine, in binary.
33 Indeed, the same is true of the natural language names: They too are only mentioned
in the table, through the use of their Mentalese names.
34 This seems to be what Fodor overlooks. He writes:
Pretty obviously, there are computational procedures which map a repre-
sentation of the acoustic properties of a speech event onto a representation
of the message it encodes. (Fodor, 1975, p. 119)
But the function being computed is one from acoustic properties to ‘messages’, i.e.,
propositions or truth-conditions or what have you.
35 The real issue here, of course, is in what sense precisely we are able to think about
other people. We’ll turn to that issue in section 4. My point here is just that the question
whether linguistic comprehension involves translation into Mentalese is orthogonal to
that issue.
36 Independently of that, I take it to be less controversial than it might seem that
competent language-users are able to think about expressions. Linguistic theory gives
us good reason to suppose that this capacity is innate (see e.g. Chomsky, 1986), though,
at the early stages, such ‘thought’ might occur only sub-personally.
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principle to our using whatever mechanism allows us to do those two
things—think about people and think about their names—to construct a
data structure that pairs expressions of natural language with people.
Nor is there any obstacle to our using that information, and related
information about other types of linguistic expressions (e.g., predicates),
to ‘compose’ interpretations of complete sentences according to their
syntactic structures.
It is still open to Fodor, of course, to suggest that the mechanism by
means of which knowledge of meaning is generated somehow involves
translation into Mentalese. But I know of no very good reason to believe
that, and it is far from clear what advantage the translational conception
is now supposed to have.37 What motivated it seems to have been some
vague sense that attributing to ordinary speakers an ability to think
about word–world relations is too demanding (if not spooky). But if we
can think about words and we can think about the world, then we can
think about relations between words and the world. Words, after all, are
just some of the things we find in the world.
3.2 Translation and Context-Dependence
Since almost all sentences are context-dependent, there are hardly any
sentence types to which it makes sense to apply the notion of truth.
We can apply the truth-predicate to utterances instead,38 but in that
case no sort of Disquotation Principle is plausible: If U is an utterance
of a context-dependent sentence Σ, then an attribution of truth to U
typically will not even have the same truth-value as an arbitrary other
utterance of Σ, let alone be ‘fully cognitively equivalent’ to such an
utterance. What’s needed, therefore, is an ‘extended’ disquotational
notion of truth: An utterance of Σ will be true iff there is some sentence
of my language an utterance of which would both correctly translate it
and be true—whatever ‘correct translation’ might be.
Consider a simple example. Suppose Maria utters:
37 It is true is that the compositional problem appears to be far more difficult in the
semantic case than it is in the translational case. The latter involves purely syntactic
operations on Mentalese symbols, whereas the former involves possibly quite complex
compositional axioms. On the other hand, as mentioned in note 31, the translational
approach requires a meta-language for Mentalese and then some sort of ‘semantic
descent’. So it is not obvious that either view has an advantage on grounds of simplicity.
38 Or to sentence tokens, or something of the sort. Such niceties will not matter in
what follows.
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(30) That woman is famous.
In order to focus attention squarely on the relevant issue, let us assume
that Maria is speaking the same language I am, so that there is no
question what sentence I need to utter in order to translate Maria’s
utterance, namely, (30) itself.39 But, of course, any utterance of that
sentence by me will also be context-dependent, so I need to accompany
the utterance by a ‘demonstration’ of some object.40 Indeed, given our
simplifying assumptions, the only thing I need to decide, to figure out
how to translate (30), is which person to demonstrate. Suppose the right
person is Eva Longoria. Then a correct translation of (30) would be:41
(31) That woman [said while demonstrating Eva Longoria] is famous.
Now, the discussion in the previous section shows that the information
that Maria’s utterance of (30) could be correctly translated by an utter-
ance by me of (31) is of limited utility. That information will, by itself,
allow me neither to interpret Maria’s utterance nor to understand attri-
butions of truth to it. What I ultimately need to know, for either purpose,
is something like:
(32) Maria’s utterance of (30) is true iff that woman [said while demon-
strating Eva Longoria] is famous.
What the disquotationalist seems to be proposing is thus, once again,
that the mechanism by which (32) comes to be known involves two
steps: translation of (30) by (31) and an application of the Disquotation
Principle to a sentence attributing truth to a contemporaneous utterance,
by me, of (31).42
To focus just on the demonstrative, what I ultimately need to know
about it is:
(33) When Maria uttered “that woman”, she was talking about that
woman [said while demonstrating Eva Longoria].
39 We will also ignore the other sources of context-dependence, besides the demonstra-
tive, that are present here.
40 In fact, as I have emphasized elsewhere (Heck, 2014), demonstrations are optional,
and context-dependence is typically resolved in other ways. But we can again ignore this
issue.
41 A different proposal is that (30) should just be translated as “Eva Longoria is famous”.
The ensuing discussion would be different in detail but similar in spirit. See note 44.
42 I shall talk here in terms of what is involved in understanding an utterance of (30).
The discussion could also be framed more metaphysically, in terms of the facts about
what such utterances mean.
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And the proposal is that I come to know (33) by deriving it from:
(34) Maria’s utterance of “that woman” can be correctly translated by
an utterance made by me, while I demonstrate Eva Longoria, of
“that woman”.
But that just seems backwards. To know which person I should demon-
strate in uttering (34), I need to know which woman Maria was talking
about when she uttered the words “That woman”; that is, it seems as if
knowledge of (34) rests upon knowledge of (33). Such facts are semantic
if any facts are. Translation of context-dependent utterances therefore
cannot proceed independently of semantic facts.
A disquotationalist might reasonably object that this argument ten-
dentiously assumes the legitimacy of such semantic notions as talking
about. But the argument really needs just the following two claims:
(i) How I should translate an utterance of a sentence like (30)—in
particular, whom I should demonstrate—depends, in part, upon
some relation between the speaker and an object in the world.
(ii) The mentioned relation must be explicable independently of trans-
lation.
To see why, note that there is a ‘pure’ disquotational notion of reference
that is supposed to be characterized by trivialities like:
(35) “Eva Longoria” refers to Eva Longoria.
But, for reasons parallel to those already rehearsed, the ‘pure’ notion is
inadequate in the case of demonstratives and other context-dependent
expressions.43 The disquotationalist thus requires an ‘extended’ notion of
reference, which we may call E-reference. This notion, like the extended
notion of truth, is presumably to be explained in terms of translation,
thus:44
43 It is a fairly common view nowadays that even proper names exhibit some sort of
context-dependence (see Bach, 2015, for an overview). If that is right, then disquotational
principles like (35) are inadequate to account for the reference of utterances of proper
names, and all the issues we are discussing here will arise even in that case.
44 One might suggest that we should instead try:
(*) Maria’s utterance of “That woman” E-refers to Eva Longoria iff her utterance can
be correctly translated by an utterance made by me of “Eva Longoria”.
But, first, the left-to-right direction arguably fails, for sense–reference-type reasons,
though that does depend upon how demanding the standards of ‘correct translation’
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(36) Maria’s utterance of “that woman” E-refers to Eva Longoria iff
Maria’s utterance can be correctly translated by an utterance made
by me, while I demonstrate Eva Longoria, of “that woman”.
Now, the question at issue here, to re-iterate, is what facts determine
which translation of Maria’s utterance is correct, which is to say: what
facts determine whom I should demonstrate when translating her. We
obviously cannot just assume that those facts are ‘semantic’. But—and
this was the first claim mentioned above—I submit that those facts must
involve some relation between Maria and Eva Longoria. That claim does
not beg the question against the disquotationalist. There are plenty of
non-semantic relations between speakers, utterances, and the rest of the
world. Perhaps one of them will do the work the disquotationalist needs
doing.
If someone wanted to insist that the burden of proof here is on the
disquotationalist—that they need to tell us which relation that is—then
I wouldn’t disagree (though I am allergic to burden-of-proof arguments).
It really is very unclear what non-semantic relation might determine
what the correct translation is. There was a time when one might
have been forgiven for thinking it was pointing at, but it has long been
appreciated that pointing is not necessary for demonstrative reference.45
Nonetheless, pointing at is a useful example, because it nicely illustrates
the sort of relation the disquotationalist needs. But here’s the thing: If
pointing at were the right notion, then E-reference would be co-extensive
(and not just materially) with pointing at. And the same goes for any
substitute that might be offered. It follows—here we apply the second
premise mentioned above—that, by the disquotationalist’s own lights, E-
reference must be co-extensive with some relation that is characterizable
independently of translation. But that makes E-reference, whatever the
right relation is, a non-disquotational notion of reference.
There are several replies a disquotationalist might make. They might
deny the first premise. Indeed, Field (1994, pp. 279–81) did once argue
that in explaining how to translate Maria’s utterance of “that woman”
we can make do just with facts about her “internal processing” and so
need not invoke any relation between Maria and the outside world. The
are. Second, if names are context-dependent (see note 43), then (*) does not avoid
the problems to be discussed next. Finally, it still seems to be in order to insist that
the correctness of the translation mentioned depends upon there being some relation
between Maria and Eva Longoria.
45 Indeed, pointing at, in the relevant sense, probably isn’t a purely physical relation
but in part a psychological one (cf. Reimer, 1991).
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idea was that which woman I should demonstrate will be determined by
what other ‘mental files’ Maria associates with this particular utterance
of “that woman”. There are several difficulties with this view, but the
simplest is that there need not be any other such mental files: Maria may
never before have heard of or encountered Eva Longoria (Heck, 2004, pp.
339–41).
A second reply denies that there is any single relation between the
speaker and an object in the world that grounds E-reference: In each
case, there will be some such relation, but there is no single relation
that does the job in every case.46 By itself, however, such an observation
would pose no threat to the preceding argument. It is one of the lessons
of recent work on demonstratives that many different relations between
a speaker and an object can support demonstrative reference (King, 2014;
Heck, 2014). So the view would have to be that there is so much diversity
that there is really no unified notion there at all, independent of the
characterization given in terms of translation. All we can say is that the
correct translation is the one that allows us to make the best sense of
Maria. We’ll consider this sort of reply, which in effect denies the second
premise, in section 4.2.
Yet a third reply is to concede both that there is such a relation and
that it can be explained independently of translation, but to deny that
E-reference has very much to do with reference as friends of semantics
would understand it. As we will see, this is probably the reply Field would
prefer: He holds a similar view about truth-conditions, in part because
of problems that arise when one actually tries to explain reference in
terms of translation. We’ll consider this sort of reply in section 4.3.
46 It is unclear to me whether anyone has ever held such a view. Both Quine and
Davidson regard translation (or interpretation) as part of what determines content. But
neither rests with vague gestures in the direction of ‘making sense’ of speakers. Both of
them articulate conceptions of the underlying facts about speakers to which a theory of
translation (or interpretation) must be sensitive, and radical translation (interpretation)
is simply a dramatization of the question how facts about correct translation (interpreta-
tion) supervene upon the underlying basis. For Quine, those facts are limited to ones
about how Maria’s sense organs have been affected by her environment, e.g., how light
has stimulated her retina (Quine, 1960, §8). For Davidson, they include facts about what
sentences Maria has ‘held true’ under what external circumstances (Davidson, 1973, pp.
322ff). What grounds the correct attribution of truth-conditions to Maria’s utterance of
(30) for Davidson, then, does include relations between Maria and objects in the world.
If it doesn’t for Quine, that is because Quine is a behaviorist, not because he thinks
translation plays a role in fixing content.
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Before we continue this discussion, however, it is worth making
explicit a limitation of the argument we have been considering in this
section.
3.3 Intentional Realism
As we have just recalled, for a disquotationalist, the correctness of a
translation is to be decided on broadly pragmatic grounds. This feature
of the view marks an important difference between disquotationalism
and what is sometimes known as intentional realism: the view that
semantic properties are robust enough to do some kind of causal or
explanatory work (cf. Fodor, 1987). It’s important to appreciate that the
arguments given in this section are not intended to provide any support
for intensional realism and, indeed, cannot do so. Let me explain why.
Quine (1960, Ch. 2) famously proposed that the way to investigate
meaning is to investigate translation: If you want to know what Maria’s
words mean, and what it is for them to mean that, then the right ques-
tions to ask are: (i) how Maria’s utterances should be translated into
your language and (ii) what the appropriate standards of correct transla-
tion are. Quine articulates an answer to (ii) using the notion of radical
translation. Davidson (1967), by contrast, thinks we should ask (i′) what
the correct theory of truth is for Maria’s language and (ii′) what the
appropriate standards are by which to adjudicate correctness. Davidson
(1973) articulates an answer to (ii′) in terms of radical interpretation.
As concerns the question what it is for Maria’s utterances to mean
what they do, then, Davidson and Quine are much closer to one another
than either is to Fodor or to early Field. There are, of course, plenty of dif-
ferences between Davidson and Quine here—most importantly, Davidson
is no behaviorist—but Davidson’s notion of radical interpretation is not
just named after but explicitly modeled on Quine’s notion of radical trans-
lation. In particular, both have a significant pragmatic component. The
ultimate test both of a translation manual, for Quine (1970a, pp. 388–9),
and of a theory of truth, for Davidson (1973, pp. 320–5), is whether it
allows one to make sense of the behavior, linguistic and otherwise, of its
subjects, e.g., to communicate smoothly with them.
The real difference between Quine and Davidson concerns how they
answer the first question: what form a ‘theory of meaning’ for Maria’s lan-
guage should take. Quine thinks we can get by with translation, whereas
Davidson (1973, pp. 316–8) thinks we must provide a theory of truth for
Maria’s language, one that will make heavy use of (non-disquotational)
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semantic notions. That is why Davidson rejects deflationism (see e.g.
Davidson, 1990, 1996), and the argument we have been discussing in this
section is meant to be compatible with Davidson’s overall outlook. But
Davidson is not an intentional realist: Despite his occasional protests to
the contrary, his insistence that facts about content essentially depend
upon pragmatic factors precludes such a view (Rescorla, 2013, p. 480).
So, unless Davidson’s views are inconsistent at this point, which I do
not think they are, it cannot suffice to establish intentional realism to
identify a role for semantic notions in interpretation.
The arguments to be presented in the next section are different: They
do favor intentional realism and so are not compatible with Davidson’s
views.
4 The Role of Falsity in Psychological Explanation
Perhaps the best known argument against disquotationalism is the
so-called ‘success argument’. The rough idea is that, if we’re going to
take our existence as rational agents seriously—if we’re going to reject
behaviorism and the like—then we need to think of our search for food,
say, as guided by our beliefs about where food is to be found. Hence, our
success in finding food will typically depend upon whether those beliefs
are true. So if you want to explain how people manage not to starve, and
you want to explain it (in part) in terms of people’s cognitive capacities,
then it looks as if the truth of our beliefs is implicated in that explanation.
And that means, or so it would certainly seem, that truth is doing serious
explanatory work, which is precisely what disquotationalism cannot
abide.
This sort of argument has it origins in the work of Hilary Putnam
(1975; 1978, pp. 17–33), but it is perhaps best known from the elabo-
ration, analysis, and defense of it due to Field (1986, §V) just prior to
his conversion to disquotationalism. The argument has since received
a great deal more attention. It seems to me, however, that most of that
discussion has done more to confuse the issue than to clarify it.47 Indeed,
Field describes his own earlier discussion of the success argument as
“so abstract and convoluted it couldn’t have convinced anyone. . . ” (Field,
2001b, p. 153), and that is when he is being charitable. My goal here,
47 A noteworthy exception is a recent paper by Will Gamester (2018), which I en-
countered long after this paper was drafted. I’ll make some remarks about it in the
footnotes.
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then, is to offer a version of the success argument that, or so I will be
claiming, gives us good reason to accept intentional realism and so to
reject disquotationalism.
4.1 Navigation and Cognitive Maps
It will help if we step back a bit and consider the simple case of naviga-
tional behavior: our ability to find our way around the world. This is an
ability that we share with many other creatures—among them rats, who,
for all their other cognitive limitations, have a strikingly good ability to
find their way around mazes. How do they do it? Part of my reason for
considering this question is that serious scientific work has been done
on it, and there are now some developed proposals that have significant
empirical support. I’ll focus on one of these here, not so much because
I’m partial to it (though I am) but because the same sorts of issues would
arise with respect to the other accounts on offer, and the one I’ll discuss
is not just relatively easy to understand but vividly illustrates what is at
stake in the present debate.
Here, then, is one popular and reasonably well-supported explanation
of how rats navigate mazes: Very roughly, rats find their way around
by making use of little maps that they carry around in their heads.48
These ‘cognitive maps’ are so-called because, or so some believe, they
actually do have a map-like structure: Spatial relations between objects
in the environment are represented, on the map, by means of geometrical
relations among ‘markers’ that represent those objects on the map.49 And
rats are very good map-makers. As they move around, they continually
update their cognitive maps, and they do so in such a way that, by
and large, their maps end up accurately representing the topography of
their local environment. So the reason rats are so good at finding their
way around mazes is that, once they’ve had enough time to explore a
particular maze, they have a map of it: They know how it is laid out.
There are two features of this account that will be important for
what follows. First, the accuracy of the rats’ maps is essential to the
explanation. That rats have maps in their heads does nothing to explain
48 The evidence for this view is nicely summarized by Michael Rescorla (2018). The
classic discussion is in The Organization of Learning, by Charles P. Gallistel (1990).
49 These maps are what Rescorla (2018, p. 381) calls ‘cogntive maps in the strict sense’.
Note that the geometrical relations need not be spatial but may be more abstract. In
fact, though, it would not matter for our purposes if rats only had cognitive maps in the
‘loose’ sense: other mental representations of topographic aspects of their environments.
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their navigational proficiency if the maps are no good. Second, the maps
are essential, too. Simply to posit that rats have lots of information about
the topography of their environment would simply beg the question how
that is possible. The answer is meant to be that this information is
encoded, as Edward C. Tolman (1948, p. 192) put it when he introduced
the idea, in “a cognitive-like map of the environment. . . indicating routes
and paths and environmental relationships. . . ”.
What ties these two aspects of the explanation together is the rep-
resentational content of the maps: We can speak of the maps as being
correct or incorrect only because they have such content; the maps en-
code information only because it makes sense to ask whether they are
correct. So Tolman’s proposed explanation is committed to the claim
that cognitive maps have something like truth-conditions. The crucial
question, to which we shall turn shortly, is how the disquotationalist
proposes to recast this sort of explanation.50
Before we address that question, however, let me emphasize that
what Tolman offers us is not just an explanation of navigational success.
Suppose Whiskers has been through the maze several times and can run
it quite quickly. But now Peter cruelly decides to change the maze slightly.
Off goes Whiskers, and the poor guy ends up crashing into a wall. Why?
Because Whiskers thought there was a door there (i.e., his cognitive map
represented there as being a door there). What the representational
content of Whiskers’s map contributes to, most immediately, is thus the
explanation of his behavior, successful or otherwise. That is to say: What
explains Whiskers’s success, in the cases in which he is successful, is
the combination of two other facts: (i) that his behavior is guided by
his cognitive map of his environment and (ii) that his map is accurate.
So, again: Representational content contributes most fundamentally to
the explanation of behavior and only derivatively to the explanation of
successful behavior. This point will be crucial later.
Let me also note that it does not matter whether one wants to call
maps ‘true’ or ‘false’ or whether one wants to speak of them as having
50 Just to emphasize: There is nothing special about this particular explanation.
Similar points could be made about a wide range of psychological explanations that
involve ‘information processing’. Tyler Burge (1986a) discusses a wide range of such
examples, and many of them could be used to make the same sorts of points I will
be making here. The central question is how we should understand the notion of
information that appears in such explanations. (The point I make next is also at least
implicit in Burge.)
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‘accuracy-conditions’ instead of truth-conditions.51 The niceties of En-
glish usage are irrelevant. For one thing, this entire discussion could
be reformulated, without loss, in terms of an alternative proposal ac-
cording to which cognitive ‘maps’ have logical rather than geometrical
structure, i.e., are language-like (cf. Rescorla, 2018, §6). But there is a
good reason to discuss maps here, namely, because they make it clear
that the pure disquotational notion of truth really is useless by itself,
since what’s fundamentally at issue has nothing to do with language.52
The issue is what role, if any, the notion of representational content must
play in our theory of the mind, e.g., whether, in explaining behavior, we
need to invoke some notion of the representational content of mental
states. It does not matter even a little bit whether that content can be
linguistically expressed, if that’s what it takes for it felicitously to be
called ‘true’.53
4.2 Translation and the Classical Disquotational Strategy
Disquotationalists are of course free to reject Tolman’s explanation of
rats’ navigational proficiency and, indeed, to reject all explanations
of mental processes in terms of computations over structured mental
representations. But the question whether to accept the so-called ‘repre-
sentational theory of mind’ has nothing obvious to do with truth: There
have, in fact, been adherents of RTM who thought that we could do with-
out the idea that mental ‘representations’ have content (Stich, 1983).54
But the promise of disquotationalism, or so I argued above, is supposed
to be that it does not require us to reject the sorts of uses to which truth
is put in (cognitive) science, but only to recognize them as ‘expressive’.
So the question in which I’m interested here takes the form: Is disquota-
51 Several people who attended presentations of this material become quite indignant
about this matter, for reasons I have never quite understood.
52 I.e., the real issue here is utterly independent of linguistic deflationism, which is
a thesis about the meaning of the word “true”, as it applies to linguistic objects (i.e.,
sentences).
53 It is an empirical issue whether all mental representations have syntactic structure
or whether some of them have other sorts of structure, such as the geometrical structure
that maps have (see e.g. Fodor, 2007; Heck, 2007; Rescorla, 2009). It would be very
unfortunate for disquotationalists if their views had implications for this debate.
54 Although it is many years too late, I’d like to take a moment to thank Fred Dretske
for introducing me to the issues we are discussing here. He taught a graduate seminar
at Duke somewhere around 1985, when I was an undergraduate, and one of the core
texts was Stich’s then recent book. Both Stich’s book and Dretske’s reaction to it have
stayed with me ever since.
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tionalism compatible with Tolman’s account? If it turns out that it is not,
then I will be happy to rest my case. Disquotationalists should not be in
the business of telling (cognitive) scientists how to do their jobs.55
How, then, might a disquotationalist understand the role apparently
played by the notion of truth in Tolman’s explanation of rats’ navigational
abilities?
The Classical Disquotational Strategy would be to show that the
use made of the notion of truth here is merely ‘expressive’, i.e., that a
disquotational notion of truth is all we need. Now, it should be clear
that the ‘pure’ disquotational notion of truth will do us no good at all.56
The maps that rats have in their heads are not ‘sentences I understand’,
so I will need to use the ‘extended’ disquotational notion of truth if I’m
to make sense of attributions of correctness to those maps. And that
means, of course, that I need to consider how to translate the rats’ maps
into sentences of my language. A disquotational explanation of the rats’
success would thus have the following form:
Rats are good at running mazes because they navigate by
little maps in their heads, and these tend, by and large, to be
constructed in such a way that they are correctly translatable
by true sentences of my language.
Or, to consider just the explanation of behavior:
Whiskers attempted to run through a wall at location L be-
cause he was navigating by a cognitive map that is correctly
translatable, in part, by the sentence of my language “There
is a door at location L”.
That is: If we pursue the Classical Disquotational Strategy, then the
disquotational substitute for an explanation of a creature’s behavior in
terms of the information encoded in its mental representations will have
55 There is a hilarious parable, due to Lewis (1991, p. 59), about a philosopher who seeks
to convince mathematicians to change their ways by confronting them with philosophy’s
litany of successes. A similar warning applies here. A sharper one would emphasize the
fate of Quine’s a priori arguments for behaviorism.
56 Gamester (2018, §§3–4) discusses the form the disquotationalists’ substitute must
take if this worry is waived—the basic idea goes back to Horwich (1990, pp. 22–3)—and
argues that it fails anyway. But his argument is focused much more on truth than on
truth-conditions, which are what I’m discussing here. (To put it differently, Gamester in
effect grants disquotationalists a claim about what the contents of the mental states in
question are. What I am questioning is their right to any such claim.)
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to invoke translation. That should be no surprise. Translation is what
disquotationalism substitutes for content.
I submit that the substitute explanations offered above on behalf of
the disquotationalist clearly fail. It is plainly false that Tolman’s rats
were good at running mazes because the maps they constructed are
translatable by true sentences of English.57 That there are such things
as people and natural languages has nothing to do with rats’ navigational
abilities: Rats would have been just as good at running mazes if there
had never been any people, which is to say that the substitutes get the
counterfactuals wrong.
The obvious reply is that what explains a given rat’s behavior is not
the existence of a certain translation but the underlying facts, whatever
they may be, that make the translation correct, appropriate, or adequate.
Talking about translation here is just a way of gesturing in the direction
of those facts. Leeds (1995, pp. 28–9) compares this case to that of the
meter stick: We can fix the length of a meter in terms of the length of
a rod in Paris, but that doesn’t imply that explanations that speak of
meters somehow implicate that rod. Fair enough. But, as Leeds (1995,
pp. 29–30) himself seems to recognize, that only raises the question
which facts about the relations between a rat’s map and its environment
are really doing the explanatory work.58 So we find ourselves, much as
in section 3.2, returned to the question what makes a given translation
of the rat’s map correct, and my own suspicion is that it is the represen-
tational content of the map. The disquotationalist owes us some other
57 Field (1986, p. 79) offers a version of this objection in his pre-conversion discussion
of the success argument. I stumbled upon it independently around 2005 when thinking
specifically about cognitive maps and only later became aware of the back and forth
between Field and Leeds, which I’ll discuss shortly. This argument is not discussed in
“Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content” (Field, 1994), and, while Field mentions
Leeds as an influence, Leeds’s paper on these topics was only published the following
year. (Hence, there is no reference to Leeds’s paper in Field’s.)
58 I confess that I find Leeds’s discussion of this issue extremely confusing. He ends up
arguing that the crucial question is whether we can make sense of objective reasons:
If we could find a way to make sense of th[e] statement [that A is a good rea-
son for B] without mention of ourselves and our conceptual scheme. . . then
we would have found our correspondence theory. The idea of looking for an
‘objective’ notion of reasons remains. . . the correspondence theorist’s best
hope. . . . (Leeds, 1995, p. 31)
But I cannot see why that should be. What do objective reasons have to do with questions
about the representational content of cognitive maps in rats? Not that Leeds discusses
this sort of case. But that is itself a symptom of the fundamental problem with Leeds’s
discussion: that he over-intellectualizes the issue.
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answer. Otherwise, they haven’t actually offered an alternative to the
content-involving explanation. They have just expressed the hope that
there might be one.59
As we’ll see in the next section, Field does sketch such an explanation
(suggesting that he takes the need for one seriously). Before we discuss
his proposal, however, I want simply to point out that, the moment the
need for such an explanation has been conceded, the Classical Disquota-
tional Strategy has failed. For what has been conceded is precisely that
the appeal to truth- or correctness-conditions in the sort of explanation
we have been considering cannot be replaced by (or understood in terms
of) ‘disquotational’ truth-conditions, whether these are pure or extended.
I take this to show that we do at least understand a non-disquotational
notion of truth and that there are possible (even actual) explanatory
projects for which it is prima facie necessary.
The reason this point has been missed is that, as we saw earlier,
disquotationalists tend to think of the truth-predicate as fundamentally
a device of generalization. So their response to the success argument
has tended to have two parts: First, particular explanations of success
need not use the notion of truth at all, because applications of the truth-
predicate to particular sentences can be eliminated via the Disquotation
Principle; Second, general reliability can be explained by generalizing
over particular explanations of particular successes. Gupta (1993, p. 67)
has raised serious questions about the second part. But the first part
has not received the same scrutiny,60 and that has made it seem as if
the only role plausibly played by the truth-predicate here is the very
59 Field (2001b, p. 154, fn. 13) raises the question, crediting Leeds, why we “should
think that there must be some means of specifying the relevant correlation [with external
conditions] that doesn’t go via translation. . . ”. But the disquotationalist has allowed that
some ‘correlation with external conditions’ is what is doing the explanatory work, so they
owe us an account of what kind of correlation that might be if it is not a representational
relation. To put it differently: Even if we cannot specify what a meter is except in terms
of some rod in Paris, what it is to be a meter long had better not essentially involve
relations to that rod, since otherwise explanations that speak of meters would implicate
such relations (and so, derivatively, that rod). So disquotationalists need there to be
some account of what such a ‘correlation with external conditions’ might be that (i) can
play the role the rest of us think truth-conditions play, (ii) does not involve semantic
notions such as truth and reference, and yet (iii) is not explained in terms of translation.
Disquotationalists can hardly expect the rest of us to take their word that there is
some such notion available, so they need to say something substantial about what the
‘correlation with external conditions’ actually might be.
60 Gamester (2018) is again an exception. A very similar sort of explanation is some-
times offered of the reliability of our mathematical beliefs. That makes me suspect that
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one that disquotationalists like to emphasize. In fact, however, the first
claim is also mistaken: The Disquotation Principle, by itself, cannot
help us to explain behavioral success, even in particular cases, because
serious explanations of behavioral success invoke mental representations,
and mental representations are not ‘sentences we understand’. So the
explanation has to invoke translation, but then the problems discussed
in this section doom the Classical Disquotational Strategy.
4.3 Truth and Indication
The question we have been discussing is how a disquotationalist might
understand the role apparently played by representational content in
map-based explanations of navigation. Appealing to translation does not
help. It just begs the question what makes a given translation correct,
and, whatever that is, that is what does the real explanatory work. So
what exactly is it that does the real explanatory work, according to the
disquotationalist?
It would be unfair to complain that Field nowhere gives us a full
answer to this question. It is not as if it is clear how representational
content enters into psychological explanation. But the request is not for
a philosophical account of psychological explanation, but just for some
reasonable indication of what the first-order explanation itself might
be. We know very well what first-order explanation of rats’ navigational
proficiency the proponent of content-involving psychological explanation
is offering. It was already outlined by Tolman.
Field himself has made important contributions to the study of how
mental representations contribute to the explanation of behavior, begin-
ning with his now classic paper “Mental Representation” (Field, 1978).
In that paper and elsewhere, Field claims that (assuming something like
the language of thought hypothesis) intentional explanations can always
be recast as purely computational explanations (Field, 1986, p. 84; 2001b,
pp. 155–6; 2001c, pp. 72–6). If we assume, as Field does, that mental
processes are implemented computationally, then of course some compu-
tational process must always underlie any given intentional explanation.
Moreover, as Field (2001c, p. 74) observes, the familiar objection that the
computational story by itself cannot explain rats’ navigational abilities
depends upon our regarding computation as ‘narrow’. If we instead take
it to be ‘wide’, in the sense that “features of the external world [can]
the argument Øystein Linnebo (2006) gives against that view could also be deployed
here. (Indeed, in some ways, Linnebo’s remarks anticipate Gamester’s.)
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appear in the computational story. . . ”, then relations in which the rats
stand to their environments become part of the computational story,
and it is no longer so obvious that we can’t explain rats’ navigational
abilities in computational terms.61 The question thus becomes, once
again: What relations between a given rat’s map and the environment in
which it lives might take over, in a disquotational explanation, the role
that representational content plays in Tolman’s account?62
Consistently throughout his writings on this topic, what Field has
offered as an alternative to representational content are what he calls
indication relations (e.g. Field, 1994, pp. 254–5). I have been unable
to find in Field a detailed explanation of what indication relations are
supposed to be. For our purposes here, however, what we will need to
know is just this: What a particular belief-state indicates is a matter of
how the world tends to be when the subject is in that state, and so is
uncontroversially reducible to physicalistically acceptable materials.63
In many cases, of course, belief-states will be reliable indicators of their
truth-conditions. That is just another way of saying that many of our
beliefs are true. But, as Field emphasizes, there will also be cases in
which what a belief-state indicates has little to do with its truth-condition.
Someone’s political beliefs might indicate only what has recently been
said by their favorite political commentator (Field, 1986, p. 89); my beliefs
about what is happening in Bosnia might correlate only with what has
recently been written in the New York Times. That, says Field (1994,
p. 255), makes any proposed reduction of truth-conditions to indication
relations “at best a gleam in the eye of some theorists”.
Despite this divergence, Field (2001b, p. 154) argues, we can still use
indication relations to explain behavioral success. Consider someone
who is trying to land a plane. An intentional explanation would posit
beliefs about airspeed and about what actions it is appropriate to take
under various conditions. But we can instead simply posit that there
are mental states C low, C good, and Chigh with the following properties:
When Goldilocks is in C low, she increases speed; when she is in C good,
61 That is: Field’s view is not vulnerable to the criticisms that Burge (1979; 1986a)
makes of methodological solipsism (Fodor, 1980), because Field’s view is not individual-
istic.
62 The disquotationalist thus now seems to be in the very predicament in which
verificationists and semantic anti-realists like Dummett have long been stuck: They
need to articulate some notion of content as an alternative to the truth-conditional notion
that they reject. That is the cost of the failure of the Classical Disquotational Strategy.
63 Indication relations thus seem to be of a piece with what other philosophers, such as
Dretske (1981), have meant by information.
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she maintains speed; when she is in Chigh, she decreases speed. And
Goldilocks tends to be in C low when the speed is too low; Chigh, when it
is too high; and C good, when it is just right.
Obviously, none of this is to be taken terribly seriously. Still, it is hard
not to be struck by its quasi-behavoristic simplicity. The story sketched
is one of stimulus and response. To be sure, Field is as aware as anyone
that mental states, in general, do not ‘correlate’ with external conditions
in the simple way that this sketch supposes they do, either on the input
side or on the output side. His response, I take it, would be to admit
the over-simplification and to insist that an appropriately similar story
can be told by a functionalist: the computational story mentioned a few
paragraphs ago. Still, one might wonder what gleam is in whose eye.64
A more serious problem is that there are well-known reasons to be-
lieve that any notion of content suitable for the purposes of psychological
explanation must be compositional: systematicity, productivity, and all
that (see e.g. Fodor and Lepore, 2002). But it is at best unlikely that
indication relations are compositional: Only certain of my beliefs about
Bosnia reflect what is written in the Times. Still, this is a well-known
problem for views that characterize content in terms of conceptual role,
and Field’s view is a kind of wide conceptual role theory. So, however
serious a problem one might think compositionality poses for such views,
it’s one they had anyway.
But it is really quite easy to see that behavior cannot be explained in
terms of indication relations. This is an immediate consequence of the
fact, mentioned above, that indication relations and truth-conditions can
come dramatically apart. To take a real case: In December 2016, Edgar
Welch drove from Salisbury, North Carolina, to the Comet Ping Pong
pizzeria in Washington D. C.—about 350 miles, or 560 kilometers—where
he opened fire with an assault rifle. He did so because he believed that
the restaurant was being used by associates of (then recently defeated
presidential candidate) Hillary Clinton as a front for a child sex ring.
What Welch’s beliefs indicated, it would seem, had rather more to do
with what was being posted on certain conspiracy-obsessed websites
than with anything approximating reality.65 To be sure, a complete
account of why Welch did what he did would have to dig deep into
‘fake news’ and the culture of the alt-right. But that has nothing to do
64 It is, in fact, far from clear that there is a content-free notion of computation to be
had. (Rescorla, 2014, 2015, 2017).
65 See https://tinyurl.com/CometPing for the account of this episode in the New
York Times.
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with why, psychologically speaking, Welch did what he did: He drove
to Washington D. C., etc., because of what he believed, namely, that a
child sex ring was operating out of Comet Ping Pong. (That was the
truth-condition of Welch’s belief.) Similarly, even if what my beliefs
about Bosnia ‘indicate’ is what’s been reported in the Times, what I do
as a result of my having those beliefs—travel to Bosnia, avoid Bosnia,
send money to Bosnia—will be determined by what it is that I’ve come to
believe (by the truth-conditions of my beliefs), not by what those beliefs
indicate.
To take one of Field’s own examples, imagine that my beliefs about
height are
systematically exaggerate[d], so that my believing a sentence
of the form ‘It is n feet high’ is strongly correlated with the
object before me being f(n) feet high, where f(x) starts drop-
ping off rapidly from x after about 6 feet or so. (Field, 1994, p.
255)
To be even more concrete, suppose that, if I see an object that is 6 feet 2
inches tall, I believe that it is 6 feet 4 inches tall. Now suppose that I
need to fit that object through a portal that I have just measured at 6
feet 3 inches tall. Will what I do be determined by how tall I believe the
object is or by what my belief indicates about how tall it is?
The reason this point has been missed, I suggest, is because of the
focus on explanations of behavioral success. If a particular piece of
behavior is successful because the beliefs that explain it are true, then
that more or less implies that indication relations and truth-conditions
will coincide in that case, which will make it hard to choose between
them. But, as I emphasized earlier (see page 29), what matters here is
the role that the truth-conditions of our beliefs play in the explanation
of behavior, not just the role that the truth of our beliefs plays in the
explanation of successful behavior. It is not just successful behavior that
is explained in terms of representational content but all (intentional)
behavior. Indication relations cannot substitute for truth-conditions in
the general case, for the simple reason that the two diverge. One might
well say, then, that it turns out to be the role that falsity plays in the
explanation of unsuccessful behavior that is crucial.66
66 Indeed, there seems to be something deeply satisfying about the way in which falsity
emerges here as the crux: It is, after all, the possibility of misrepresentation that seems
to demand some notion of representational content. Otherwise, we could just make to
with correlations (see e.g. Dretske, 1986).
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To circle back: All these points apply just as well to rats’ cognitive
maps. It was a large part of Tolman’s point that the role cognitive maps
play in the explanation of navigation cannot be reduced to stimulus and
response:67 There is no simple story to be told of the form “If the map has
this feature, then the rat will turn right”.68 And even if we were somehow
to arrange, in the case of some particular rat, for indication relations to
diverge from truth-conditions, then it would still be the content of the
map that explained the rat’s behavior, not what the map indicated.
I conclude, then, that indication relations cannot play the role that
truth-conditions are supposed to play in intentional explanation. The
argument just given seems, in fact, to show that no relation between
mental representations and the external world that diverges from truth-
conditions can play that role.69 That brings us very close to showing that
nothing but truth-conditions can play that role, but it will be enough for
now to observe that nothing else seems to be on offer.
5 Disquotation and Reduction
Field (1994, pp. 249–51) tells us that attempts to articulate an alterna-
tive to truth-conditional approaches to content have tended to flounder
because they have accepted that very burden: to articulate a notion of
content other than the truth-conditional one and, in some cases, even
to re-characterize the notion of truth itself. Disquotationalism is meant
to be an heir to such views that allows us to reject the demand for such
alternatives. It insists that there are utterly unproblematic notions of
truth and of truth-conditions, characterized in terms of disquotation,
that everyone must accept. And it conjectures that, on examination,
it will turn out that the only theoretical role the notions of truth and
truth-conditions are ever really needed to play—whether in philosophy,
linguistics, logic, or psychology—is the ‘expressive’ role for which the
disquotational notions are custom-built. What I have been calling the
Classical Disquotational Strategy amounts to an attempt to prove that
conjecture, one case at a time.
67 Tolman made the proposal we have been discussing at a time when behaviorism
dominated American psychology, and his proposal is explicitly presented as an alterna-
tive to a behaviorist account. Indeed, it is one of the earliest examples of what would
later come to be called ‘cognitive psychology’.
68 Special thanks to Dilip Ninan and Marcus Gianquinto here.
69 To make fully explicit the connection to the end of section 3.2: E-reference cannot
play the role reference plays in intentional explanation if the two come apart.
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I have argued here that the Classical Disquotational Strategy fails
in at least two cases: that of context-dependent utterances and that of
psychological explanation. It is, of course, open to disquotationalists to
offer alternatives to truth-involving explanations rather than to attempt
to reconstrue them disquotationally. But, if so, then it is hard to see what
disquotationalism is contributing to the effort. To give what is perhaps
an extreme example: Quine wouldn’t have been troubled in the least by
the question what role truth-conditions play in psychological explanation,
but that’s not because he was a disquotationalist; it’s because he was a
behaviorist.
All of that is purely negative, of course, and I admit that I have done
nothing here to address the question how representational content can
play a significant role in psychological explanation. But I’ve started
to wonder whether part of what underlies the disagreement between
disquotationalists and intentional realists is a different disagreement
about what work actually needs to be done here.
In early discussions of deflationary theories of truth (e.g. Horwich,
1990), they were often contrasted with correspondence theories, coher-
ence theories, and the like. But it was quickly pointed out that opponents
of deflationism need have no interest in any of those alternatives (see e.g.
Davidson, 1990, 1996). There is a dangerous ambiguity in the phrase
“theory of truth”. Such a theory can be one about the nature of truth,
or it can simply be one that is ‘about truth’ in much the same way that
Peano arithmetic is a theory about the natural numbers. Maybe no
theory of truth’s ‘nature’ is possible, not because truth is ‘insubstantial’,
but because, as Gottlob Frege (1984, opp. 59–60) thought, truth is too
fundamental to be definable in other terms. To defend the semantical
viewpoint, then, we do not need a theory of truth’s nature. We just need
a theory that tells us some true things about truth.
All of that is widely appreciated nowadays. But the corresponding
points about content are not. I mentioned earlier that Field’s own em-
brace of disquotationalism seems to have been motivated, at least in
part, by the failure of various attempts, throughout the 1980s, to reduce
semantical notions to broadly physical ones. Those, of course, were ‘the-
ories of content’ in the sense in which the correspondence theory is a
theory of truth. But one might wonder why the failure of the reductionist
project should have surprised anyone. As Fodor (1989, p. 413) famously
quips, “. . . nothing ever seems to reduce to anything. . . ”, and yet that
does not disqualify unreduced notions from doing serious explanatory
work, or so Fodor (1974) famously argues elsewhere. No doubt, there’s
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a great deal more to be said about this, but that is very much my point.
Absent further argument, the irreducibility of semantic notions to phys-
ical ones merits no more than a shrug unless you assume some strong
form of reductionism (cf. Chomsky, 2000).
I suggest, then, in closing, that we should at least consider the pos-
sibility that it is with content as it is with truth (cf. Burge, 1986b, p.
719). To defend the representational (truth-conditional) viewpoint, we do
not need a theory of content’s nature, one that reduces content to more
basic notions. It is enough to have a well-motivated theory in which
representational content has a central role to play. Such a theory would
tell us about representational content by making some true claims about
it.70 Cognitive science, or so I have argued, contains at least one example
of such a theory, and there are many, many more (see Burge, 1986a),
including in the branch of cognitive science known as linguistics. Of
course, any such theory might be false; maybe all of the extant ones are.
But the sorts of arguments presented here plausibly apply to any view
that makes serious use of a notion of representational content. To be
sure, the idea that the mind is an information-processing device may
eventually prove ill-founded. But that sort of question will not be settled
by conceptual analysis of the word “true”.71
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